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Donald W. The Blessing of Burntisland. Jenny Stanton. Embodied Emotions. Rebekka Hufendiek. Metapsychology and the Foundations of Psychoanalysis. Simon Boag. The Borderline Patient. James S. Kohut's Freudian Vision. Philip F. Clinical Workbook for Psychotherapists.
Robert Langs. Pioneers of Interpersonal Psychoanalysis. Carola Mann. Memory, Language, and Bilingualism. Mark Leffert focuses on the uncomfortable fact that analysts and therapists can and do make many mistaken assumptions and false moves within their clinical practice, and that there is a tendency to ignore the significant levels of uncertainty in what they do.
Beginning with a discussion of the phenomenology of the self and its relations with the world, the book moves on to? This book will be of interest to Psychoanalysts and psychotherapists, neuroscientists and academics in the fields of psychiatry, comparative literature and literature and the mind. Neem contact met mij op over Events Sprekers Incompany. Welkom terug. Uw account. Agenda Seminars Masterclasses e-learning Sprekers Incompany.
Actueel Opinie Interviews Recensies Videos. Beoordeel zelf slecht matig voldoende goed zeer goed. Phenomenology, Uncertainty, and Care in the Therapeutic Encounter. Gebonden, blz. Therefore, we can speak of thinking within perceiving , on the one hand. On the other hand, in this experience, I realized the possibility of introspectively perceiving my own ongoing thinking and perceiving actions which are normally focused on outer events and therefore blind to themselves.
In other words, the attention in thinking and perceiving processes could be split into two parts, a heteronomous and an autonomous one Witzenmann, , and therefore we can also speak of a specific perceiving within thinking.
A closer investigation of the phases we undergo in such experiences leads to the following conclusion in line with the structure-phenomenological conception. The quite surprising option to deliberately see the world as false — the dark smoke which I could repeatedly evoke — shows that I first had to leave the proper interpretation of the percept — the rising fog before the dark background. In order to change the view, it is necessary to discard the previously seen content in favor of another meaning structure; each content only becomes available by producing a thought content.
In other words, the first two steps include a separation and an integration. The separation refers to the former perceptual content, the integration to an expected content which is not yet perceived. It has to be actualized by thinking activity which means an inner, integrative and holistic gesture.
But because thinking of dark smoke does not amount to actually seeing dark smoke, the actualized thought content has to be oriented and focused toward the unclear perceptual field. This focusing accompanied with a restriction of the universal conceptual range results in a search movement approaching and scanning the visual field in order to find appropriate anchorage points. And in the end, if successful, the dark smoke is actually perceived — even if there is none — with a brief, habitual certainty.
To sum up, the last two steps include both a separation and an integration. The separation refers to the universal horizon of meaning of the thought content in the sense of its restriction to an individual case of perception. And in restricting all thinkable expressions of dark smoke to only one, the thought content receives the form of being merged with the perceptual stimulus. In this way, the leading thought content becomes individualized and will therefore be able to build an integrated whole together with the stimulus.
Only now, as a consequence of the preceding mental events as sufficient conditions , does the stimulus that was initially passively perceived as a necessary condition reach the state of active, conscious existence. Otherwise, I would not have seen it as real for a moment. Complementary structure of perceiving and thinking. In the structure-phenomenological inquiry of a perceptual reversal four micro-gestures of mental action can be distinguished.
They can be generalized as forms of mentally separating turning away, restricting and integrating producing, turning toward. Regarding the above remarks on non-conceptual representation, we are now able to embed this notion in the described basic structure of separating and integrating mental actions. Exactly, at the transition point between turning toward to the stimulus and turning away from it the former stable perception disappears with open eyes before a new thought content has been grasped.
In this moment, we feel slightly irritated because we are exposed to the raw, non-conceptual experience of the stimulus. However, this processual stage denoted above as an epistemic crisis, has not to be confused with W. Due to its phenomenal quality, it could be interpreted as a consciousness-related effect of the neural activity offering decomposition separation as well as the opportunity of recomposition integration of our mental world.
The latter, however, in its consciousness-related effectivity, cannot be delegated to the brain, but rather has to be mentally performed and optionally observed in wakeful mental action. To sum up, using the structure-phenomenological method, we can analyze our thinking in perceiving or perceived thinking in perception as a continuous oscillation between mental actions or micro-gestures whose forms we can denote as separating and integrating. Although this is a mental structure as indicated by Steiner and Witzenmann and illustrated here by individual examples, it does not remain merely subjective.
The crucial point here is that this first-person research approach does not stick to individual sensations, which could be suspected of being externally influenceable and internally deceitful. Rather, it works with distinct forms of mental action serving as phenopractical tools or, psychologically spoken, as independent variables which could be deliberately controlled by the introspecting researcher.
The voluntary and aware use of these mental variables leads to reproducible conditions and intersubjectively verifiable mental states and structures in the sense of performative coherence Bitbol and Petitmengin, , see above. Therefore, this processual structure can be taken as a second working hypothesis for further investigation in first-person consciousness research.
Compared with older or newer hypothetical constructs of information processing e. Further consistency could be achieved by referencing back to the first part of this study.
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While the first hypothesis that I presented refers to the historical development of human consciousness, the second hypothesis refers to the ongoing genesis of consciousness in our minds. These two perspectives, which at first were discussed separately from each other, now seem to show the same structure. While the historical perspective shows the mental movements of separation and integration on a larger temporal scale, of which the people of past epochs remained largely unaware, the view of introspective or meditative phenomenology may unveil this structure today in our own conscious experience and experienced process of consciousness.
In other words: what formerly operated as an implicit process tends to become explicit 1 day. Thus, the challenge is to clear the fog in this field in order to investigate further the hypothesis of an isomorphic structure of consciousness processes on different temporal scales. In this way, we can establish a new synthesis of thinking and perceiving in modern consciousness phenomenology as a consequence of the previous historic development and of our own systematically trained experience.
As shown, human performances of consciousness historically diverged into thinking and perceiving and passed through different phases of predominance, with an alternating bias for each form of knowledge. With the emergence of modern science, the former inwardness of a period emphasizing pure thought was overcome and compensated by the strong intention to observe and measure the outer things themselves instead of fruitlessly discussing them. But very soon, the ingenious combination of theoretical thought and quantitative data collection adopted the other one-sidedness of a predomination which emphasized the outer, perceptual or measurable world.
Here, as indicated above, the previous development of psychology may serve as an instructive example. Consequently, the essential benefit of modern empirical science goes beyond all the great and highly specialized discoveries made by physicists, chemists, biologists, and psychologists. Rather, it can be seen in the inner methodical relation of thinking and perceiving that has become apparent through the past centuries, although initially limited to outer, material fields of enquiry.
However, it would be tragically mistaken to rest on this. As the philosopher Jean Gebser said, all great ideas which have become leading principles for whole epochs tend to evolve to one-sided and deficient forms of expression Gebser, So, why not dig out the buried core of science, purify it from its materialistic contamination and refine it to yield a new, differentiated and integrative science of consciousness?
The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and approved it for publication. The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Albertazzi, L. Bennett, M. Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Oxford: Blackwell.
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The radical plasticity thesis. How the brain learns to be conscious. Danziger, K. The history of introspection reconsidered. De Houwer, J. Proctor and J. Dehaene, S. Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing. Neuron 70, — Toward a computational theory of conscious processing. Dennett, D. Are we explaining consciousness yet?
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